Archive

theorizing bodies

Thomas Smith, "Change Islands Tickle," 1828. Image courtesy of Memorial University of Newfoundland, Centre for Newfoundland Studies

Thomas Smith, “Change Islands Tickle,” 1828. Image courtesy of Memorial University of Newfoundland, Centre for Newfoundland Studies

Thinking hard about sexual initiation today, and in particular, thinking through the idea of tickling. I know,  on the surface, it doesn’t sound like it links up, but those of you who have followed my random musings for a while might recall this post about a young man who experienced a “chatouillement voluptueux” after practicing onanism for a while.

The English word tickle, as it’s used in conversations among children – that is, as something you do to terrorize a friend or younger sibling (in the sense of “Watch out, here comes the tickle monster!” or “if you don’t stop, I’ll tickle you”) –  doesn’t do much justice to the experience described in the letter, so I went off to the Oxford English Dictionary Online to look for more historical understandings.

The first definition (caution: link will only work if you have a subscription to OED Online) took me by complete surprise. It shouldn’t have, but it did:

“A name given on the coasts of Newfoundland and Labrador to a narrow difficult strait or passage.”

Given my current home, this should not at all have surprised me. After all, I’ve seen it often and looked it up before. But buried as I am in eighteenth-century letters, I wasn’t really thinking of geography. I’ll amend that. I wasn’t thinking of geography in the sense of bodies of land. But I suppose I was thinking of bodily geographies of a very different sort….

To be affected or excited by a pleasantly tingling or thrilling sensation; to be stirred or moved with a thrill of pleasure: said of the heart, lungs, blood, ‘spirits’, etc., also of the person.

and in earlier usage:

To tingle; to itch; also fig. to have an uneasy or impatient desire (usually to do something); to be eager.

And there it is. Pleasure. Sensuality. Body. Desire. Eagerness. Tingling.

It’s all there.

And in the examples provided, clear reference to tickling as an intimate experience and as something reflexive; that is, a body that tickles itself, a body that can pleasure itself.

Off to see what the French understood…

Eighteenth-century French definitions associate the idea of tickling with flattery. Tickling can be the bodily sensation that one experiences upon being flattered; it can also be the flattery itself. Thus, one can be tickled when one hears positive comments about one’s children. But, significantly, one’s body is also tickled when it is flattered. Consider the examples offered in both the 1762 and 1798 dictionaries produced by the Académie française (again, I suspect the link will only work if you have a subscription to the Dictionnaires d’autrefois project):

On dit, que Le vin chatouille le palais, le gosier; que La musique, l’harmonie chatouille l’oreille, les oreilles, pour dire, que Le vin, que La musique flattent agréablement les sens.

Tickling as pleasure emanates not only from physical touch, but also from what might be understood as “tickled senses.” Touch, taste, hearing – all of these can provoke pleasure.

Back to the Oxford English Dictionary:

1589   ‘Pasquill of England’ Returne Pasquill 16,   I needed no Minstrill to make me merrie, my hart tickled of it selfe.

Like the English dictionary entries, the French focus on tickling as an experience of bodily pleasure.

Considerably different, however, is the French focus on tickling as an act of flattery; in this evocation, tickling emerges out of a social encounter (and it hearkens back, interestingly, to histories of comportment in the form of honnêteté and bienséance….), even as it is experienced within the body.

I’ll have to play – tickle myself? – with this element a bit more…

—————————–

“tickle, n.1″. OED Online. March 2013. Oxford University Press. 2 May 2013 <http://www.oed.com.qe2a-proxy.mun.ca/view/Entry/201758?rskey=kZOCNR&result=1&isAdvanced=false&gt;.

“tickle, v.1″. OED Online. March 2013. Oxford University Press. 2 May 2013 <http://www.oed.com.qe2a-proxy.mun.ca/view/Entry/201761?rskey=kZOCNR&result=4&gt;.

“chatouiller”. Dictionnaire de l’Académie française. 1762; 1798. Dictionnaires d’autrefois. 2 May 2013. <http://artflx.uchicago.edu.qe2a-proxy.mun.ca/cgi-bin/dicos/pubdico1look.pl?strippedhw=chatouiller&gt;.

“Change Islands Tickle.” Digital Archives Initiative. Centre for Newfoundland Studies. Memorial University of Newfoundland. 2 May 2013. ,http://collections.mun.ca/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/maps&CISOPTR=348&CISOBOX=1&REC=3&gt;.

I spent a glorious morning on Wednesday reading the dictionary. Actually, I read several dictionaries. And an encyclopedia. To be completely honest, I didn’t read the whole dictionary or encyclopedia; I read selected entries in each one.

My terrain? The dictionaries included in the ARTFL project’s  Dictionnaires d’autrefois database. It’s a great collection that spans almost three full centuries of thought.

Given my work in eighteenth-century studies, I generally focus on the dictionaries published between 1694 and 1798:

  • Dictionnaire de l’Académie française, 1st edition (1694)
  • Dictionnaire de l’Académie française, 4th edition (1762)
  • Jean-François Féraud, Dictionnaire critique de la langue française (1787-1788)
  • Dictionnaire de l’Académie française, 5th edition (1798)

Within these, I am most interested in the fourth and fifth editions of the Dictionnaire de l’Académie française, as they neatly bookend my current research project: the French version of Tissot’s treatise on onanism appeared in 1760 and it was closely followed by what would soon come to be seen as his magnum opus, the Avis au peuple sur sa santé, which appeared just a year later. The letters to Tissot start streaming in immediately after this. The letters end in 1797, the year of Tissot’s death.

These two editions also bookend a particular interesting period in European political and intellectual thought: the French Revolution at the end of the century is perhaps the most obvious marker, but we can’t forget the publication of such key works as Rousseau’s Emile (1762), Julie (1761), Du Contrat Social (1762) (is my Rousseau bias showing yet?).

Dictionaries and encyclopedias provide fascinating insights into how a community thinks (or thought). A survey of several dictionaries, published across a span of several decades, can be particularly intriguing because it allows you to trace the trajectory of meaning (this is also why I enjoy perusing the Oxford English Dictionary Online http://www.oed.com/). Meanings can change subtly, even in a space of 30 years, and those subtleties can be deeply revealing.

Among other things, yesterday’s forays took me to such concepts as “peuple” and “patrie.” On the surface, those terms would appear to be self-evident, and, indeed, there are only minor changes in their definition between 1694 and 1798. But these changes are, to me, highly significant.

So let’s take a closer look.

In 1762, the Dictionnaire de l’Académie française offered the following under the first heading for “peuple.”

PEUPLE. s.m. Terme collectif. Multitude d’hommes d’un même pays, qui vivent sous les mêmes lois. Le peuple Hébreu. Le peuple Juif. Le peuple d’Israël. Le peuple Hébreu a été appelé le peuple de Dieu. Le peuple Romain. Les peuples Septentrionaux. Les peuples d’Orient. Les peuples Asiatiques. Les peuples du Nord. Les peuples de Provence, de Dauphiné, &c. Tous les peuples de la terre.

Looking more closely at the entry under the second heading offers further insight:

PEUPLE se prend quelquefois pour Une multitude d’hommes qui sont d’une même religion, soit qu’ils soient du même pays ou non. Ainsi en parlant des Juifs, on dit, que Le peuple Juif est dispersé par toute la terre.

En parlant à un Prince de ses Sujets, on lui dit, Vos peuples, votre peuple.

Il se dit aussi d’Une multitude d’habitans qui vivent ou dans une même ville, ou dans un même bourg ou village. Il y a beaucoup de peuple dans Paris. Tout le peuple du bourg, du village accourut.

Il se prend aussi quelquefois pour La partie la moins considérable d’entre les habitans d’une même ville, d’un même pays. Il y eut quelque émotion parmi le peuple. La plupart du temps, le peuple ne sait ce qu’il veut. Il n’y avoit que du peuple à la promenade. ….

Interesting here is the way that this concept integrates questions of socio-economic class with broader concepts of social location, education, religious belief, and geography.

The 1798 definition is very similar: there is still a Jewish people, spread across the earth; there is still a grouping of residents living in the same region, there is still a prince and he still has his people.

But the new definition elaborates on the idea of the prince and his “peuple”:

En parlant à un Prince de ses Sujets, on lui dit, Vos peuples, votre peuple, non pour exprimer que le peuple est sa propriété, mais qu’il est l’objet de ses soins.

In this new iteration, the Prince’s subjects are not his possessions to do with as he pleases; rather, they are possessions for he must take responsibility: the people are the object of his care and concern. This is a substantive change, one that acknowledges and reflects the political and ideological transformations wrought by the French Revolution (it is entirely possible that this meaning was already implied in previous editions; however, it is clear that the editors of the dictionary felt it was important to articulate this point directly and overtly in this edition).

When we look at the word “patrie,” we see similar operations at play. Let’s start with the Encyclopédie entry (also available through ARTFL; English translations of some articles are available through the Encyclopedia of Diderot and d’Alembert Collaborative Translation Project , for which I have also contributed five translations).

Interestingly, Jaucourt, author of the Encyclopédie definition of “patrie” links the concept to the idea of the family: “patrie,” of course, comes from the Latin root pater, or father. But he also actively gestures towards a maternal imaginary, waxing poetic on the idea of patrie as nurse and mother:

C’est une nourrice qui donne son lait avec autant de plaisir qu’on le reçoit. C’est une mère qui chérit tous ses enfans, qui ne les distingue qu’autant qu’ils se distinguent eux – mêmes; qui veut bien qu’il y ait de l’opulence & de la médiocrité, mais point de pauvres; des grands & des petits, mais personne d’opprimé; qui même dans ce partage inégal, conserve une sorte d’égalité, en ouvrant à tous le chemin des premières places; qui ne souffre aucun mal dans sa famille, que ceux qu’elle ne peut empêcher, la maladie & la mort; qui croiroit n’avoir rien fait en donnant l’être à ses enfans, si elle n’y ajoutoit le bien – être….

What is clear, in any case, is that “patrie” is linked to a notion of family, of belonging, of membership. The “patrie” is a family cocooned in generosity, benevolence, care and grace, an entity that wishes good for all who belong to it.

So what does this mean for the dictionary entries? The 1762 entry offers the following:

PATRIE. s.f. Le pays, l’État où l’on est né.

The definition here brings forward questions of belonging by virtue of birth (which, once again, links to the idea of the family and the nursing mother), but what is more interesting are the examples offered:

La France est notre patrie. L’amour de la patrie. Pour le bien de sa patrie. Pour le service de sa patrie. Servir sa patrie. Défendre sa patrie. Mourir pour sa patrie. Le devoir envers la patrie est un des premiers devoirs. Cicéron est le premier des Romains qui ait été appelé le père de la patrie. On étend quelquefois ce mot à des Provinces, à des Villes. Paris est sa patrie.

Patrie inspires deep commitment and responsibility; the responsibility to protect, to serve, to defend … to die for the homeland. Belonging carries with it immense responsibilities.

These elements are also present in the 1798 version, but with one key difference. By 1798 it is no longer enough to die for the homeland. This conceptualization has been expanded:

Il est doux de mourir pour la patrie.

Death is no longer just a responsibility; it is sweet, good and right, a balm undertaken for the good of the whole.

After this spate of hiring is finished, I’ll get to frolic more frequently with dictionary entries. I can’t wait.

I’ve been reading Annie K. Smart’s Citoyennes: Women and the Ideal of Citizenship in Eighteenth-Century France over the past few days, and as I read, I’m finding myself nodding along.  Moving away from – but still indebted to – scholars like Joan B. Landes, Carole Pateman and others who argued that women were actively excluded from political citizenship in the eighteenth century, Smart instead argues for a different vision of citizenship. Drawing on the insights of Uma Narayan, she asserts that citizenship is not just about public rights such as the right to vote or hold office, but it is about active engagement with and for the good of one’s society. As Smart writes:

A feminist vision of citizenship would embrace all members of a nation who actively participate in civic and political life….According to Narayan, citizenship is about belonging: ‘Citizenship has always been about membership, participation and belonging as well as about respect, dignity, status-equality, and a variety of rights.’ Citizenship is thus an active quality that demands participation in matters relating to the public good. (7)

I find this vision of citizenship immensely appealing. It responds to concerns I had when I first encountered the work of Landes, Pateman and others, and it also responds to my personal fascination with Rousseau. Now, Rousseau’s been a thorn in feminism’s side for a good while. Some feminist thinkers hate him. Some love him. Others find his work contradictory, ambiguous. Almost nobody is ambivalent. What is clear is that there is no single ‘feminist’ response to Rousseau. Nope, we’re all over the place on what Rousseau is saying and what his visions have to offer (or not). While I personally find Rousseau’s work problematic on some levels, I am also very much drawn into other aspects of his political vision and I’m really not ready to toss him overboard.

But back to Annie Smart. Smart’s argument is that the home was the key incubator of citizenship; it is in the home – and through the actions of nurturing mothers (mothers who nursed not only with their milk, but also with their care – that individuals developed their understandings of citizenship. In this conceptualization, the home is not a private, domestic space divorced from the political sphere; rather, it is integral to the political. It is the very birthplace of the citizen.

That people identified the home as a site of civic virtue is evident in the letters addressed to Tissot as well. While the performance of maternal virtue – the nursing mother, the doting mother, the mother who puts her health on the line for the sake of her child(ren) – is an obvious starting point, it’s also been very intriguing to read about virtuous fathers. Such fathers foreground their parental responsibilities, articulating a vision of citizenship premised not only on their own social positions as workers, but also on their roles and responsibilities as parents and further, on the health of their children (and how this health might affect their ability to contribute to the public good). Fatherhood and family are integral to their presentation of self. Equally interesting are the letters from individuals who experienced bodily distress as a result of family conflict. In these instances, bodies manifested emotional distress; in numerous cases, Tissot indicated that bodily disorder was the result of “chagrin” – grief as a result of discord and struggle.

If one thing is clear from reading these letters, it is that the family and the domestic were not imagined as passive or neutral spaces; rather, they were deeply implicated in questions of moral and civic virtue.

A friend of mine died last Sunday. I’ve been processing this loss all week. Disbelief and horror have given way to resignation, reflection. Tears threaten, sometimes. And at other times, I find myself smiling. Memories murmur around me, sliding into focus and then out of focus. And each day, something new emerges.

I met Kate in 2008, within a few months of my arrival in Newfoundland. I don’t remember exactly how we met, but I can guarantee that she had Newman, her Newfoundland dog, with her. Newman was her sidekick. Her best bud. Her guardian. Newman went everywhere with her. Newman also resigned himself to silly photos: Newman with a Santa outfit. Newman with Anne pigtails. Newman the brave, the gentle, the big hearted, the trusting, the generous. Newman, the dog who embodies, in canine form, everything that I love about Kate.

Kate and I worked, conceptually at least, in similar research areas: both of us fascinated by life stories, by the paths available for the articulation of the self, and by the meanings that emerge in the process of such ruminations. We were both interested in memory and how memory shapes identity. We have talked about bodies, and bodily memories, and politics.

I have learned much from Kate.

We have spent many hours talking about teaching, about learning, about pedagogy, about reaching first year students. She was absolutely passionate about teaching. And in my conversations with some of her students over this past week, I have come to learn just how very passionate they were about her. She has, literally, transformed their lives.

But our conversations have not only been about teaching. We have talked, too, about women’s studies and about feminisms. About disciplines. About belongings. About exclusions. Serious, thoughtful, sometimes frustrating conversations. Conversations that have no end, really, but that still need to happen. That still need to be shared.

We have also shared social lives. We have laughed at baby showers, parties and playgrounds. We communed over dinners and brunches. She shared Newman’s clownfish stuffy with my son, and later, in another visit, he taught her how to play chess. Kate even spent time teaching me how to drive (and for her patience in that endeavour, I am mightily grateful).

And now, as I say goodbye, it is Kate, too, who will teach me about loss: “Remembrance always has a pedagogical element,” she wrote in a 2010 book chapter  (239).

She expands on this idea in her thesis, where she writes:

The work of the teacher, then, is to grapple with our attachments, and in so doing, this mode of attentiveness can be offered back to our students. Because, as Judith Butler so eloquently states, in grief, “Let’s face it. We’re undone by each other. And if we’re not, we’re missing something …. One does not always stay intact. It may be that one wants to, or does, but it may also be that despite one’s best efforts, one is undone, in the face of the other” (Precarious Life” 19) …. while the experience of loss is painful and difficult – in fact, it can be excruciating – it is also productive because it can disrupt, unsettle and be the catalyst for new knowledges about the self and others. (171-172)

 

Kate was a beautiful woman. Honest, forthright, sensitive, generous, thoughtful. She wore her heart on her sleeve. She lived her life with truth and integrity. She laughed easily.

In the shuffling of office space that accompanied my arrival at Memorial University, her office became mine. I spent the first week trying to figure the voice mail system. After numerous attempts, I managed to change the outgoing message. I never did work out how to change the access code. Nor was I able to change the internal voice message.

But my technical incompetence has had some unforeseen benefits. When I pick up my messages, it is Kate’s code that I type in, and it is Kate’s voice that welcomes me to my voice mailbox. She’s still here. Her spirit will not soon leave this place.

I miss you, Kate.

Kate Bride 21.05.1968 ~ 07.04.2013

 

References:

Bride, Kate. “‘Learning to Love Again’: Loss, Self-Study, Pedagogy and Women’s Studies,” PhD Thesis, Memorial University, 2009.

Bride, Kate. “Death on the Ice: Representation, Politics, Remembrance,” in Despite this Loss: Essays on Culture, Memory and Identity in Newfoundland and Labrador, eds. Elizabeth Yeoman and Ursula Kelly (St. John’s: ISER, 2010), 226-245.

Not that this is news to anyone who thrives on stories and storytelling, but researchers are “discovering” that the brain is powerfully affected by the act of reading.

Stories fire up the senses in myriad ways, building connections across different regions of the brain. Moreover, this research confirms what I was told many years ago – the brain does not distinguish between a ‘real’ or an ‘imagined’ event. Those of us who read know that literature takes us on all sorts of adventures, journeys of exploration and discovery in which we learn as much about ourselves as we do about the world around us.

I could get into a rant about how something is only ever accepted as “true” if it’s granted credence by ‘science,’ but perhaps that’s a rant for another day. For the moment, it’s nice to see that science has finally caught up. As Ann Murphy Paul writes:

These findings will affirm the experience of readers who have felt illuminated and instructed by a novel, who have found themselves comparing a plucky young woman to Elizabeth Bennet or a tiresome pedant to Edward Casaubon. Reading great literature, it has long been averred, enlarges and improves us as human beings. Brain science shows this claim is truer than we imagined.

I’ve spent the last few days with Helene Cixous. Well, not literally. Rather, I’ve spent it with her writing, revising an essay on The Day I Wasn’t There, a haunting novella about life, loss and longing.

I adore Cixous. I fell in love with her “Laugh of the Medusa” the very first time I read it. Nobody else in my class was as entranced as I was. And my love affair has only continued. I love the way she writes. I love how she thinks with words through words about words. I love how she plays with language with punctuation with meaning. When I read her, I am in bliss. ecstasy. jouissance.

I’m like that about most ‘French’ theory, but Cixous definitely holds a special place. Her work is…well, there’s no word that can really capture it….

“Do you see theory as if it’s poetry?” my husband asked me earlier tonight, “Because you talk about it as if it’s poetry.”

“What else could Cixous possibly be?” I say.

cixous

I have to say, this takes the idea of corporeal autobiography in a whole new direction. what does transposed flesh tell? Whose stories does it tell? And where’s Donna Haraway when you need her?

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/business/mice-as-stand-ins-in-the-fight-against-disease.html?_r=0

From the article:

“In what could be the ultimate in personalized medicine, animals bearing your disease, or part of your anatomy, can serve as your personal guinea pig, so to speak. Some researchers call them avatars, like the virtual characters in movies and online games.”

I could call today’s post cheating, because I first wrote it seven years ago. Yes, seven. 7. sieben. zeven. sept..

I, however, see it as inspiration. This post was one of a required series of posts written for a class blog in my Feminist Theory class with  Helen Leung at Simon Fraser University. It was my first introduction to blogging and I was decidedly uncomfortable. It was in this post that I first felt like I could “let my hair down,” the first time that I felt I’d found a voice, my voice, in a blogging space. And rereading it now, seven years later, I’m amazed at how many of my current interests, ideas and musings are encapsulated within it.

Join me in a walk through memory lane, of the hair-y kind. And to Helen – thanks. It was great to find this blogging voice.

There’s a piece by a Dutch composer (Chiel Meijering) called ‘A Lady Shaves Her Legs.’ It’s for harpsichord and guitar. I have no idea what it sounds like, and I have no idea if I’d even like it, but I almost bought the CD just for its title….. There’s something irreverent about it (especially given the fact that this composer has also written works called ‘A Fart in a Blizzard’ and ‘The Nostrils of Sophia Loren’), but at the same time, there’s something that compels further reflection….

A lady shaving her legs…it’s the ubiquitous image of North American femininity, so much so that a recent internet forum poll on shaving didn’t even allow the option of ‘don’t shave,’ [edited to add that by recent I mean 2004...] and while obviously the statistics of an internet forum are questionable, a wander through the personal hygiene aisles at a local pharmacy seemed to bear this out. As a  non-shaver, this fieldtrip was also extremely instructive – I had no idea that there were so many different options when it came to removing ‘unwanted’ and ‘unnatural’ body hair – you can hot wax, cold wax, warm wax…even lavender wax…who knew?)

But while it’s the ubiquitous image of North American femininity, it’s also the completely invisible image of North American femininity, and in this sense, Chiel Meijering’s title takes on a voyeuristic quality…

The act of shaving is an extremely intimate and potentially sensuous one if one imagines the razor gliding soundlessly across the smooth planes of a woman’s flesh. Perhaps that’s why it remains invisible. I mean, when does one ever see a woman shaving her legs? You can pluck eyebrows or put on makeup on public transit; you can touch up your lipstick in a restaurant bathroom; you can hike up your panties almost anywhere and I have even seen women curling their (head) hair in public.

Looking further, you can read about women getting dressed, or having showers, or drying and styling their hair, or putting on makeup or jewellery, but how often do you read about them shaving their legs? Can you imagine the following passage appearing in a novel of your choice: “She gazed lovingly into his eyes, searching for the spark of sensual interest that she knew she would find there. A seductive smile played about her lips. Feigning innocence, she turned away, reached for her disposable razor and slowly began shaving her legs”…sounds ludicrous doesn’t it?

On the one hand, then, we’re ‘supposed’ to remain hairless (except for the glorious cascade of shining locks – nurtured by the shampoo brand of your choice – falling seductively from our heads) and on the other, we’re supposed to keep it a secret that we even had hair to begin with. Shaving, it seems, is not fit for public – or even private – consumption; rather, it must remain shadowed and permanently unknown –

perhaps the lady doesn’t shave her legs at all?

Perhaps the hair was never there to begin with?

Perhaps she’s just a tease?

It’s a mystery that seems impossible to solve….

So I went on a search for body hair.

It’s almost invisible in much canonic visual art. A poster of Matisse’s ‘Nude on a Yellow Couch’ (1926) graces our bedroom wall. See the soft, undulating curves of female flesh, the full globes of breast rising on her chest as she reaches her arms behind her head, the sensuous fleshiness of curvaceous hips melting seamlessly into knees and feet.

She is all curves; she is all woman…luxe, calme et volupté…she is all hairless, a smooth, depilated body exposed for all the world to see…

Scroll back through a few hundred years of art history and the story is the same: the truly feminine woman is a hairless woman. Botticelli’s famous Venus, painted in the late 15th century, has the requisite cascading locks, and may possibly have other hair under her armpits and in the pubic region, but the rest of her body is quite naked indeed, with nothing to disturb the unnaturally glowing whiteness of her mythical body. François Boucher, lasciviously painting odalisques during the decadent middle years of the eighteenth century, retains Botticelli’s supernatural glow in his painting of Mademoiselle O’Murphy (1752), the Irish teenager who,  at fourteen, was one of the king’s favourites. Again, we see an overabundance of sensual curves with buttocks flowing imperceptibly into fleshy legs. And again, we note a complete absence of hair – Boucher almost manages to avoid the issue altogether by painting his model on her stomach…but we can still note clearly that her legs – long expanses of creamy flesh – are gloriously liberated from the confines of excess hair…(or the artistically problematic irritations of ingrown hairs, razor nicks and patches of dry skin).

Biblically speaking, the presence of hair denotes power. The mighty Samson loses his power when Delilah shaves his head in the dark of the night…even in our current culture, the masculine and the virile are represented by thick mops of head hair, forests of chest hair and muscular arms and legs covered in hair. This is the Marlboro man; the strong man; the powerful protector and saviour….

One would think that the feminine imperative for long, shimmering locks of head hair would bear out the ‘hair is power’ theory, but I wonder if our culture’s obsession with female depilation negates the biblically empowering effect of head hair….

On the other hand, perhaps, as women, we’re still paying for the evil Delilah’s transgression: sentenced to an eternal replaying of her disempowering deed, we endlessly subject ourselves to a process of depilatory self-flagellation: clucking, pecking…..and looking for all the world like a new species of plucked chicken.

I don’t knit. Well, I knitted once. I was about 8 and it was meant to be a blanket for a doll I had. Somehow I cast on extra stitches by the row on one end and lost them on the other, and soon enough my rectangular blanket turned into an odd trapezoid-esque thing. And after about 30 rows I got bored. It was purple, grey and white, and even I could tell, right from the get go, that there was something, shall we say…. lacking… in my effort.

Knitting needles abandoned.

But I’m wondering if I might want to pick up those needles again. I’ve been reading Betsy Greer’s Knitting for Good lately. Greer’s notion of craftivism – a union of craft and activism – resonates with me… and it builds a connection between the kinds of carework that formed the basis for women’s activism in times gone by, with the interests that contemporary crafters and activists bring to the fore.

Craft has been, and continues to be, a way for women to claim citizenship, to give voice to the issues that concern them and their communities most, and to contribute to what might be deemed ‘the greater good.’

Here in Newfoundland, we need only to consider the efforts of the Women’s Patriotic Association, whose members knitted thousands upon thousands of pairs of grey socks for the men of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment, and we can think, too, of NONIA, the Newfoundland Outport Nursing and Industrial Association. Through NONIA thousands of outport women knitted and sold their wares, in the process raising funds for vital nursing care in remote communities.

We can also look further, to the Faroe Islands, and the emergence of ‘266B-Bindiklubburin,’ a ‘knitting club’ formed to call on the government of the Faroe Islands to ratify measure 266b, a hotly-debated measure which would, in a radical departure for this relatively socially-conservative nordic nation, expand existing anti-discrimination laws to include sexual orientation. Knitting clubs, all-female social gatherings which convene around the act of knitting and include healthy doses of gossip, have sustained Faroese women’s community and identity from the eighteenth century onwards and remain a vital aspect of women’s communal life in most Faroese villages and towns, many of which boast numerous clubs. In this instance, the women involved in ‘266B-Bindiklubburin’ didn’t knit at all, but took on the club identity (or were assigned it by the media) as a way of further a political and activist cause.

We can look too, to the work of Swedish handcrafter, Kerstin Lindstrom, who brought together knitters from various parts of the world for her project, “Knitting in Circle,” which considers how we might imagine time through knitting. In this form, the lowly act of knitting – in performance -  forms the basis for profound conceptual work in the areas of space, time and place.

All of this might be understood under the broad rubric of bodies and citizenship. I’d even argue that a broad definition of life writing – like those offered by Sidonie Smith, Julia Watson, Marlene Kadar and others  – would allow us to consider all of this life writing as well, stories of self and community constructed and disseminated through the transformative power of craft.

High on today’s North American political agenda is reproduction. Every day brings more discouraging – well, let me rephrase – Every day bring horrific news as state after American state affirm their constitutional rights over women’s sexual and reproductive bodies. Texas’ controversial transvaginal ultrasound law has been lampooned by Gary Trudeau in a hard hitting series in Doonesbury this week. Ohio senator, Nina Turner, meanwhile, has turned the debate on its head, arguing that men who want access to Viagra need to have appointments with sex therapists and to provide letters from at least one sex partner. While The Onion has, typically, satirized the whole situation (and very effectively), the fact still remains that over 430 bills on reproductive issues have been introduced in the US, just in the last three months alone.

Add Rush Limbaugh’s slut shaming into the mix and there’s a whole storm brewing.

A few years ago, a loose group called Wombs on Washington organized themselves around the issue of reproductive rights and started knitting miniature uteri from a pattern available online (thanks to my friend and colleague Beth Pentney for introducing me to their work!). Now, in the wake of extensive yarn bombing initiatives through which often anonymous crafters have laid claim to lamp poles, phone booths, trees, bike racks, etc, in various corners of Canada, the UK and the USA,  might it be time to reconsider that project? Where might we put our knitted uteri? Which lawmakers do you know that could benefit from one (or several)? Which public spaces might we claim? Could we hand them out, just as condoms are handed out? Could we craft installations? Could we organize knit ins?

The assault on women’s rights to their bodies is real. It’s chilling. And it’s not going away any time soon. Given the historic associations of knitting needles with illegal abortion, that’s a cause worth (re)learning to knit for.

Blog neglect has set in, the result of a busy term, busy children, and the inevitable winter cold-cum-laryngitis. I’ve also just finished revising a conference paper into a journal article, and that, too, has necessitated some thinking downtime.

That’s not to say that things haven’t been actively percolating away, stewing, brewing, and festering in the recesses of my mind, but rather, that they haven’t actively formulated themselves into something worthy of sharing with a larger public.

I’ve been reading a lot about the politics of reproduction in the past few weeks. Mostly this is due to my students’ required readings – and while it’s tempting to say that I had a hand in organizing this (I did), there’s more to it. My 4000-level students are reading a single issue of a different feminist journal every week. The issues were all published within the last year and taken together these twelve journals allow us to contemplate what might be considered “contemporary feminist issues”. This approach was the brainchild of my colleague, Jocelyn Thorpe, inaugurated during last year’s iteration of the course (we took our assignments in very different directions, however).

It’s an effective approach, and one of the most effective aspects about it is the element of serendipity. My students and I are, in more ways than in other classes, equals in this space of exploration: none of us knows what will await us. Yes, I’ve chosen the journals. And yes, they’re all feminist journals. But beyond that point, we’re journeying together in uncharted waters.

Uncharted waters allow for the possibility of serendipity. Because there is no ‘order’ pre-imposed on the course content, none of us knows what will happen in that space. We don’t know which ideas will collide with one another. We aren’t sure where sparks will fly. We don’t know if any unifying themes will emerge, and, if they do emerge, we don’t know what shape they’ll take. We don’t know where we’ll be challenged. We don’t know where we’ll find ourselves traversing well-worn terrain.

So far, that journey has been quite illuminating, and I think we’ve all had to push our own boundaries in intriguing ways.

One constant over the past few weeks has been the relationship between reproduction, the state, citizenship, the body and identity. Last week, during our foray through an issue of the Journal of Women’s History, we encountered the curious juxtaposition of Soviet  and slave-owners’ pro-natalist policies. Amy Randall examines the role of legalized abortion within official state-sanctioned pro-natalism in 1950s Russia.[1] Sasha Turner, meanwhile, considered how Jamaican slaveowners worked to ensure the stability and size of their slave labour force during the twenty years preceding the abolition of the slave trade.[2] This week’s articles, from a special issue of WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly, ask us to consider the idea of “ruin.” The reproductive body looms large once again: from the repressive policies of the Ceausescu government in Romania,[3] to the disembodiment often associated with the medicalization of pregnancy and childbirth,[4] and the relationships between environmental and racial sanitation in the work of Charlotte Perkins Gilman and Ellen Richards.[5]

Read in and through one another, all of these articles remind us of the centrality of the reproductive body to questions of national identity and the continued interest of the state (very broadly speaking) in ensuring the “health of the nation.”

It would be nice to say that this kind of stuff only happens under repressive regimes. After all, the articles are about conditions in the Soviet Union, Romania, and Jamaica under slavery. And while Kristin Egan’s article on Gilman and Ellen Richards reminds us that such ideas can permeate even the “most civilized” of nations (to the extent that they are fully normalized), the ugliness of eugenics and euthenics, remains, comfortingly, in the past. We sagely note that Tissot, too, with his admonitions against novels and masturbation, died over two hundred years ago.

It’s easy, from that perspective, to congratulate ourselves. Pat ourselves on the back. Job well done, mate. We live in enlightened times. Hands washed. Everything’s put away.

Even Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale, published in 1985 under the shadow of reproductive rights debates in Canada, would appear, at first glance, to be nothing more than a fantasy, a dystopian nightmare comfortingly removed from reality.

But if the articles tell us anything at all, it’s the opposite. The intertwining narratives of reproduction, the nation and citizenship have been with us, in various guises, for a long time, and across many geographic regions. The state continues to have a vested interest in the wombs of the nation. What stories will the future authors published in the Journal of Women’s History tell about the imbrication of reproduction, nation and citizenship in early 21st century Canada and North America? How will political debates around ‘personhood’, abortion, transvaginal ultrasound, and citizenship appear to these scholars of the future? And if we imagine ourselves in their place, how might they appear to us?

The Handmaid’s Tale is being written/enacted/legislated as we speak. Various US states have toyed with or implemented legislation requiring women seeking abortions to ‘consent’ to non-medically necessary transvaginal ultrasounds. Other states have flirted with amending laws in such a way as to render miscarriage itself a crime. In Canada, despite the Prime Minister’s insistence that “As long as I’m prime minister we are not reopening the abortion debate,” numerous members of his caucus have mused publicly on a range of issues directly associated with reproductive rights.

And in the midst of all of this, we haven’t even yet begun to explore the politics of contraception and fertility: states that have required women on benefits to submit to long term hormonal contraception, fertility treatments offered only to those who don’t present as ‘fat’ (and previously, only to hetero married couples), the ethics and politics of international surrogacy, etc.  Added to this, we might also engage a broader conceptualization of reproduction to include the politics of parenthood (read: motherhood) and the role of the state: the 60s scoop that divided aboriginal children not only from their immediate families but also from their cultures, mirrors some of the practices described in Gilman’s Herland.

Mothers and their bodies, too, are regularly subjected to public and medical scrutiny: In Ceausescu’s Romania, women were subject to monthly gynecological checkups to ensure their compliance with state reproductive mandates. In the USA, all women “capable of pregnancy,” regardless of sexuality and sexual practice, are encouraged to take folic acid supplements in the event that they might, at some point, become pregnant.

I could go on. And I’m sure the knowledges that you, dear readers, bring to the table, could further ‘flesh’ this out.

Reproduction, the state and citizenship have long been feminist battlegrounds … much longer, even, than the term “feminist” has itself existed. But as these articles unfortunately demonstrate, these issues remain as current today as they were in the past.

Vigilance, dear readers. Constant vigilance.


[1] Amy E. Randall, “‘Abortion Will Deprive You of Happiness!’: Soviet Reproductive Politics in the Post-Stalin Era,” Journal of Women’s History, 23, no. 3 (2011): 13-38.

[2] Sasha Turner, “Home-grown Slaves: Women, Reproduction, and the Abolition of the Slave Trade, Jamaica 1788-1807,” Journal of Women’s History, 23, no. 3 (2011): 39-62.

[3] Roxana Cazan, “Constructing Spaces of Dissent in Communist Romania: Ruined Bodies and Clandestine Spaces in Cristian Mungiu’s 4 months, 3 weeks, and 2 Days and Gabriela Adamesteanu’s ‘A Few Days in the Hospital,’” WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly, 39, nos. 3-4 (2011):  93-112.

[4] Holly Prescott, “Reclaiming Ruins: Childbirth, Ruination and Urban Exploration Photography of the Ruined Maternity Ward,” WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly, 39, nos. 3-4 (2011):  113-132.

[5] Kristen R. Egan, “Conservation and Cleanlienss: Racial and Environmental Purity in Ellen Richards and Charlotte Perkins Gilman,” WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly, 39, nos. 3-4 (2011):  77-92.

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.